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We revisit the claims about the biological underpinnings of economic behavior by 
specifically exploring if observed gender differences in risk/time preferences can be 
explained by natural fluctuations in progesterone/estradiol levels during the menstrual 
cycle and by prenatal exposure to testosterone levels. Results suggest that natural 
fluctuations in progesterone levels have a direct effect on discount rates and that 
estradiol/progesterone levels can indirectly affect time preferences by changing the 
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I. Introduction 
Decision making is a process of complex cognitive operations that are performed consciously 
and is influenced by personal as well as environmental variables. One of the variables that could 
affect cognitive operations is gender.  In fact, many aspects of economic decision making have 
been found to differ by gender. A common finding is that these differences are caused by 
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differences in preferences (e.g., in risk preferences, social preferences) and reactions to 
competition (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Yet the reasons why there are preference differences 
between genders are not well known. There are two possible mechanisms by which preferences 
can be shaped between genders: a) preferences are shaped by gender roles that are set by social 
and behavioral norms and b) preferences are shaped by biological and physiological differences 
of the two genders.  We examine this latter mechanism given that the question of how much of a 
role nature plays in determining preferences is still considered an open one. 
Behavioral economics has embraced the view that we can use the lens of biology to look at 
economic behavior. In this sense, Burd (2010) argues that much of our economic behavior is the 
legacy of our adaptation to survival and the reproduction tasks faced by our ancestors in natural 
environments. The biological basis of preferences posits that preferences are naturally hardwired 
on males and females due to hormonal effects that take place prenatally. This view that 
preferences are innately programmed is supported by the early appearance of gender differences 
in young boys and girls. Both males and females start off with a brain that “looks” female. 
However, as Brizendine (2006, pp. 14) notes, “a huge testosterone surge beginning in the eighth 
week will turn this unisex brain into male by killing off some cells in the communication centers 
and growing more cells in the sex and aggression centers. If the testosterone surge doesn't 
happen, the female brain continues to grow unperturbed”. 
Scientific evidence on sex differences in the brain have been regularly emerging. These 
variations occur throughout the brain, in regions involved in language, memory, emotion, vision, 
hearing and navigation (Society for Women's Health Research, 2008, March 3). Physiologically 
understanding the relevant sex differences from the expression of steroid hormone receptors, to 
neuronal spines and to the entire brain systems (Becker et al., 2008) might be essential in 
explaining documented gender differences in economic decision making contexts. 
The question of whether preferences of males and females have biological roots is relevant 
especially from a policy perspective given that gender differences have been observed in 
important domains including consumption, investment and in the labor market. Therefore, 
understanding gender differences can be used to illuminate the debate on gender-specific 
outcomes in the labor and goods markets. Also, given the important welfare consequences 
associated with economic decision making in many domains, understanding the biological 
mechanisms that mediate such people’s economic preferences is of utmost importance. As 
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discussed in the next section, no other known study has examined a direct link between hormonal 
levels and non-hypothetically elicited time preferences while the studies that examined hormones 
and risk preferences have not entirely provided consistent results.   
In our study, we examine the effect of prenatal exposure to testosterone levels and natural 
fluctuations of two female hormones (progesterone and estradiol) on risk and time preferences 
using a conventional lab experiment. We proxy prenatal exposure to testosterone using a 
biological marker, the ratio of the length of the 2nd (index) finger to the 4th (ring) finger of the 
subjects' hand (D2:D4 ratio). Natural fluctuations of progesterone and estradiol levels are 
proxied by self-reported menstrual cycle information from female subjects in our experiment. 
Our results suggest that natural fluctuations in progesterone levels have a direct effect on 
discount rates and that estradiol and progesterone levels can indirectly affect time preferences by 
changing the curvature of the utility function (i.e., risk preferences).  Our findings also imply that 
prenatal exposure to testosterone is a significant predictor of risk and time preferences, 
particularly among males.  
This paper is structured as follows. To properly set the context and importance of the topic of 
our study, the next section reviews the scant but accumulating evidence on the role of hormones 
on economic decision making and the approaches taken in the literature. Section 3 describes our 
experimental procedures in detail. Section 4 describes our sample and particularly how we 
measured and handled menstrual cycle information and the D2:D4 ratio. Section 5 reviews our 
structural approach in jointly estimating risk and time preferences. We then present the main 
results in section 6 and conclude in the last section. 
 
II. Literature review 
The literature that examines the association between hormones and economic decision 
making, while small, is growing at a fast pace. Our literature review search identified 36 papers 
that examine the role of at least one hormone in an economic game, experiment or decision 
making in general. This literature uses either (1) indirect measures of hormones (e.g., the 
menstrual cycle as a proxy for estrogens and progesterone), (2) indirect measures of prenatal 
exposure to hormones (i.e., use of the D2:D4 ratio as a proxy of testosterone exposure), (3) direct 
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measurements of hormones (i.e., saliva samples or blood plasma are usually taken from 
experimental subjects) or (4) experiments with exogenous administration of hormones. The last 
approach uses placebo groups as control groups when making comparisons. 
Table 1 lists the papers that fall under one or more of the categories we listed above. 
Obviously several studies can be classified under more than one category. The studies shown in 
the table have been published in various journals most of which are non-economics journals. It is 
encouraging to see, however, that a few papers have made it to major experimental economics 
journals like Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization and Experimental Economics 
(Buser, 2010; Pearson & Schipper, 2012) or even more general audience journals such as the 
American Economic Review and Journal of Risk & Uncertainty (Garbarino et al., 2011; Zak et 
al., 2005a). Table 1 shows that the majority of the studies employ proxies of hormones such as 
the menstrual cycle or the digit ratio. The reason for this is intuitive; data collection of these 
proxies is less invasive and of minimal cost. Studies that analyze saliva or blood samples are 
expected to be more costly (although more accurate measurements can be achieved) and thus 
adoption of these methods is subject to budget constraints. Experiments that exogenously 
administer hormones to subjects solve an inherent problem of the above mentioned methods 
(with the exception of the digit ratio), which is the endogeneity of hormonal measures with 
decision making. The caveat is that the invasive nature of these experiments precludes their 
wider adoption. For example, oxytocin administration to females may cause miscarriage (Zak et 
al., 2007) and testosterone administration has only been approved in males by the US Food and 
Drug Administration (Zak et al., 2009). 
We will only review the studies that implicitly or explicitly deal with the association of risk 
and time preferences with one or more hormones. Obviously the literature involves a wider 
variety of tasks and games including self-selection into competitive environments (Apicella et 
al., 2011; Buser, 2010; Wozniak et al., 2011), explorations of the Allais paradox (Da Silva et al., 
2011), bidding behavior in auctions (Pearson & Schipper, 2012), decision making in trust, 
ultimatum, dictator, public good and prisoners’ dilemma games (Burnham, 2007; Buser, 2011; 
Eisenegger et al., 2010; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Millet & Dewitte, 2006; Millet & Dewitte, 2009; 
Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 2010; van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006; Zak et al., 2005a; Zak et 
al., 2005b; Zak et al., 2007; Zethraeus et al., 2009) as well as entrepreneurship decisions (White 
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et al., 2006). A critical synthesis of the above mentioned studies that would explain differences 
in methods, findings etc. is indeed warranted and is the subject of a companion working paper. 
Just two of the studies reviewed deal with explicitly identifying a link between hormones and 
time preferences, albeit in hypothetical tasks. In Millet and Dewitte (2008) subjects were asked 
to indicate how much money would they require in 1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 1 
year to make them indifferent to receiving 15€ now. The authors found a significant association 
of digit ratios and impulsiveness when subjects were in a “subordinate” position, as induced by a 
loss in a contest, but they did not find a significant relationship after winning a contest. This 
study, however, comes with several shortcomings. For one, subjects were recruited for course 
credit and no salient incentives were given. The discounting task was purely hypothetical as well. 
Another issue is that the study used deception at some point of the procedures. To the extent that 
subjects suspected that deception was involved in the experiment, this may have affected the 
results. In addition, they implicitly assumed a utility function that was linear in wealth. 
Takahashi et al. (2008) assessed testosterone levels in male students using saliva samples and 
then had subjects complete Kirby’s (hypothetical) monetary choice questionnaire (Kirby & 
MarakoviĆ, 1996; Kirby et al., 1999) in which subjects state their choice between smaller 
immediate rewards and larger but delayed rewards. They found a positive linear relationship 
between testosterone levels and the hyperbolic discount factor in gains, but found no relationship 
between testosterone levels and discount factor in losses.  
Further evidence of a link between time preferences and hormones are only implicit in the 
associated literature.  For example, Daly et al. (2009) explore the biological roots of time 
preferences only by relating discounting with heart rate variability and blood pressure but not 
with hormones. The widely used D2:D4 ratio, which has been used as a proxy of prenatal 
exposure to testosterone, has been shown to affect some cognitive skills (see Austin et al., 2002; 
Manning, 2002 for a survey). In turn, several other studies have shown that time preferences are 
correlated with cognitive abilities such as mathematical ability (Benjamin et al., 2006), IQ tests 
of innate cognitive ability (Dohmen et al., 2010), a nonverbal IQ test (Raven’s matrices) (Burks 
et al., 2009) or a cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005). Thus, an implicit link between 
hormones and time preferences is implied in these studies. However, to our knowledge, no other 
known published study has explored a direct link between hormones and time preferences.  
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The picture is a little different when it comes to risk taking behavior. The approaches taken 
in the risk preferences literature vary significantly. In the next subsections, we organize the 
discussion of the literature on the link between hormones and risk preferences around the four 
ways that are used to measure or proxy hormonal levels, as mentioned in the beginning of this 
section. 
A. Indirect measures of hormones 
This strand of the literature tries to explain differences in risk preferences in terms of the five 
phases of female subjects’ menstrual cycle. In these studies, self-reported measures of the 
expected beginning of the next menstruation as well as the cycle length are normally elicited 
from female subjects. Estrogen (estradiol is the predominant form in non-pregnant females) and 
progesterone secretion levels normally have diverging patterns across a regular 29-day menstrual 
cycle (see Figure 1)1, thus observed differences in risk preferences between phases of the cycle 
and/or differences with male subjects can be attributed to the effect of the different levels of the 
hormones. A high estrogen (estradiol) phase corresponds to cycle phases two and four while a 
high progesterone phase coincides with the fourth phase. Females using hormonal contraceptives 
are subject to a different cycle, with a 21-day intake period followed by a 7-day break. The 21-
day period is characterized by constant daily doses of an artificial estrogen and an artificial 
progestin. Thus, studies usually take extra care of showing the robustness of their results with 
and without pill takers or by comparing a separate group of oral contraceptive users with a group 
of normal cycling females. 
Bröder and Hohmann (2003) recruited 85 female students at the University of Bonn. 
Participants in this study had to repeatedly answer the same questionnaire at 1-week intervals. 
After attrition, 51 students were analyzed in the study half of which were pill takers. Subjects 
were asked to check which of the 40 activities they had participated in during the preceding 24 
hours. The list of activities was compiled after a pilot study with females and males, such that 20 
of the activities were considered risky (e.g., get dressed sexily when going out) and the rest were 
considered non-risky (e.g., watch TV at home). Thus risk taking behavior was defined as risk 
over sexual assault in this study and not over monetary prizes. Depending on when menstruation 
                                                 
1
 The normal cycle is often quoted to last 28-days but as we explain later in the paper this is not true. 
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occurred during this 4-week interval, the fertile window of subjects (i.e., the ovulatory phase) 
was assessed. Results showed that women change their behavior over the ovarian cycle, by 
selectively reducing activities that expose them to risky activities during ovulation. The effect 
disappears for females who use hormonal contraception. 
Burns (2006) analyzed data from 176 female students at Michigan State University. Risk 
preferences were elicited over hypothetical monetary choices and students were asked to choose 
between a sure prize of $85 and a lottery with 85% chances of receiving $100. They classified 
the subjects into one of the menstruation phases based on self-reports of subjects’ first day of last 
menstruation and duration of menstrual cycle. Oral contraceptive use was also assessed. The 
authors found that females were less likely to choose the risky choice (i.e., the lottery) and more 
likely to choose the sure prize when at the ovulatory phase, but that this effect disappeared for 
females on the pill. 
Schipper (2011a) administered an extended Holt and Laury (2002) task that involves lotteries 
with monetary losses as well (Laury & Holt, 2008) to 208 students from UC Davis. Menstrual 
cycle information (that were used to classify women in one of the cycle phases) and 
administration of hormonal contraceptives information were also obtained. The authors found no 
significant correlation between risk aversion and the menstrual cycle for gains or losses. 
While limited, the literature overall finds that females tend to be more risk averse in the non-
monetary domain as well as in the monetary domain with hypothetical payoffs when in 
ovulation. However, when real monetary incentives are introduced, no differences exist between 
phases of the menstruation cycle. 
B. Indirect measures of prenatal exposure to hormones 
The literature on prenatal exposure to sex hormones largely employs the D2:D4 digit ratio of 
the subjects' right hand. The digit ratio has been found to be positively correlated with prenatal 
exposure to estrogen and negatively correlated to prenatal exposure to testosterone (see 
Manning, 2002). Typically, males have lower digit ratios than females. In contrast to other direct 
or indirect measures of hormones, the digit ratio measure is exogenous to economic decision 
making since it is determined before birth and hence, before external socio-economic factors can 
affect behavior. In these types of studies, ethnic diversity is usually taken into account since the 
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digit ratio can vary significantly between ethnicities. Many studies employ Caucasian subjects to 
avoid making comparisons between ethnically diverse samples. 
Dreber and Hoffman (2007) study risk taking behavior of 147 students in the Stockholm 
School of Economics but report results only for the Caucasian subsample (125 subjects). They 
elicit risk preferences by asking subjects to choose how much money out of SEK 1700 (aprox. 
$250) to invest in a risky investment that pays nothing with probability of ½ or 2.5 times the 
investment with probability of ½. The amount invested is taken as a measure of risk preferences. 
Subjects with higher digit ratios were less willing to take the investment risk although the effect 
was marginally significant when using right hand measurements (most, if not all, studies use 
right hand measurements). Apicella et al. (2008) using an ethnically diverse sample of 98 males 
(mostly Harvard University students), employed a similar investment game with Dreber and 
Hoffman (2007). They found that risk-taking (using an investment game) did not correlate 
significantly with digit ratio. 
Coates and Page (2009) analyzed data from 53 male traders from a trading floor in London 
over a period of 20 months (no information are given on ethnicity) and found that traders with 
lower digit ratios (higher exposure to prenatal testosterone) take higher risk, as measured by the 
standard deviation of their profits and losses. 
Using 550 ethnically mixed MBA students at the University of Chicago, Sapienza et al. 
(2009) found that risk aversion, as defined by choice of a risky career in finance after graduation, 
was positively correlated with the digit ratio. This suggests that higher risk aversion was 
associated with low prenatal testosterone exposure. The effect, however, was rather small and 
not statistically significant.  
Trahms et al. (2010) report results from 90 Caucasian entrepreneurs sampled from a 
conference in Midwest USA. They measured risk propensity using a 6-item survey measure and 
found no significant relationship of digit ratios with risk propensity.  
Schipper (2011a) used and ethnically mixed sample of 208 students from UC Davis (see 
previous subsection for more details on this study) and found no significant correlation between 
risk aversion, for losses or gains, and the digit ratio. No differences were observed within ethnic 
subsamples as well. 
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Garbarino et al. (2011) study risk taking behavior of 152 Caucasian students by asking them 
to perform a series of lottery choices in an Eckel and Grossman (2008) 50-50 task. They also 
vary between subjects the framing of lotteries as gains, losses or mixed. They find that subjects 
with smaller digit ratios (implying higher prenatal exposure to testosterone) chose significantly 
riskier financial options. Results were robust as per framing of lotteries as gains, losses or mixed. 
Brañas-Garza and Rustichini (2011) examine whether digit ratios from 188 Caucasian 
students can predict risk aversion as elicited from two different lottery choice tasks. They find 
that low digit ratio in males is associated with higher risk taking. They also find that a substantial 
part of the effect of testosterone on attitude to risk is mediated by abstract reasoning ability. 
However, they find no significant correlation among females.  
Overall, while some studies find that low digit ratio is correlated with higher risk taking (or 
lower risk aversion), there is an equal number of studies that fail to find a correlation between 
digit ratio and risk preferences even though sample sizes seem adequate for achieving lower 
noise in their estimates. 
C. Direct measures of hormones 
Studies that directly measure hormonal levels are more demanding and invasive in nature in 
the sense that blood or saliva samples are required from subjects. Samples have then to be frozen 
and sent for analysis in a technically specialized lab. These experiments are demanding in terms 
of cost, time and effort; thus their number tends to be limited in the associated literature, 
especially if compared with the number of studies using digit ratios. A caveat with these types of 
studies is that the evidence could be purely correlational given that samples that are taken before 
the experimental tasks could create expectations that affect hormonal levels.  On the other hand, 
if samples are collected after the experimental task ends, one could not be sure about the 
direction of causality; i.e., was it hormonal levels that affected decision making or the other way 
around?  In addition, time of the day when the experiment is conducted might create variations in 
hormonal levels. For example, testosterone levels exhibit circadian variation during a 24-hour 
cycle (Cooke et al., 1993). 
Schipper (2011a) measured testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol levels from 
saliva samples (see previous subsection for more details on the recruited sample) and then 
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administered an extended Holt and Laury (2002) task that involves lotteries with monetary losses 
as well (Laury & Holt, 2008). He found that risk aversion was negatively correlated with 
testosterone and positively correlated with cortisol (a stress hormone) for gains only. In males, 
testosterone was negatively correlated with risk aversion for gains only, while in females cortisol 
was marginally significantly positively correlated with risk aversion only over gains.   
Apicella et al. (2008) (see previous subsection for more details on the recruited sample) 
found that risk-taking (elicited as amount willing to invest in  arisky investment) correlates 
positively with salivary testosterone levels while Sapienza et al. (2009) (see previous subsection) 
found that higher levels of circulating testosterone were associated with lower risk aversion 
among women, but not among men.  
Coates and Herbert (2008) recorded testosterone and cortisol levels from 17 male traders 
from a trading floor in London for 8 consecutive business days, taking saliva samples twice per 
day, at 11:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Profit and losses were recorded as well. The authors found a 
positive association between a trader’s morning testosterone level and his day’s profitability. 
They also found that a trader’s cortisol level rises with both the variance of his trading results 
and the volatility of the market, which implies that cortisol levels are increased by risk. 
Overall, most studies discussed above find a positive correlation between circulating 
testosterone levels and risk taking behavior. One study finds that risk aversion positively 
correlates with cortisol levels while another study finds that risk increases cortisol levels. These 
last two results seem like a contradiction. Only one study tries to correlate estradiol and 
progesterone with risk preferences, but fails to find any link. 
D. Exogenous hormonal administration 
Not surprisingly, there are only a few studies that exogenously administered hormones since 
these types of studies tend to be the most obtrusive and invasive in nature. In these studies, one 
group of people is typically administered the hormone under investigation while another group is 
administered a placebo. 
Among the few that administer hormones, there is only one study that elicits risk preferences. 
Zethraeus et al. (2009) administered testosterone, estrogen, and placebo to 200 healthy post-
menopausal females in the 50-65 years age group over a 4 week period. At the end of the 
treatment period, subjects’ financial risk aversion was measured by choice between certain 
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payoffs and 50/50 gambles. However, no significant effect of hormones was observed on 
economic behavior regarding risk preferences. 
 
III. Experimental procedures 
To elicit risk and time preferences, we used the multiple price list procedure proposed by 
Holt and Laury (2002) for risk preferences and by Coller and Williams (1999) for discount rates. 
In the multiple price list procedure, subjects get to choose between a left and a right option in a 
series of ordered list of options. For the discount rate task, individuals choose between a 
principal at a sooner date and a larger amount of money at a future date. The list is ordered in 
increasing order of the amount of money. The implied discount rate for the first few pairs of 
choices is negligible, thus we would expect few subjects to choose the future payment. On the 
other hand, the implied discount rate for the last pairs of choices in this ordered list of choices is 
larger and we would expect more subjects to delay payment.  
The intuition is similar for the risk preference task. Choices in this task are between 
lotteries; a safer and a more riskier lottery. Probabilities of lotteries are varied along the list so 
that the list is ordered in increasing order of expected payoffs. For the first few rows one option 
dominates the other in terms of expected payoff while for the last few rows this pattern reverses. 
Thus we would expect risk averse subjects to make more safer choices (i.e., choose the left 
option more often) while risk loving subjects to make more riskier choices (i.e., choose the right 
option more often). 
The risk preference task is essential for our experimental design since it allows us to 
control for the curvature of the utility function. Precise inferences about discount rates can only 
be made once we identify the utility function. Andersen et al. (2008) showed that it is essential to 
have one experimental task for measuring the curvature of the utility function, another task to 
identify the discount rate conditional on knowing the utility function, and then jointly estimate 
the structural model defined over the parameters of the utility function and discount rate. More 
recently, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) extended the methodology proposed by Andersen et al. 
(2008) by developing a procedure they called the Convex Time Budget (CTB) method that does 
not require a separate risk aversion task to identify the curvature of the utility function. The 
procedure involves giving the subject 100 tokens to allocate between the sooner and later time 
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period, and then varying the exchange rate between tokens and money for sooner or later 
amounts2. We opted not to use this procedure since we were also interested in knowing the 
specific effects of key variables on risk preferences. 
While Andersen et al. (2008) placed the time preference task at the very end of each 
session, we vary the order of the risk and time preferences tasks to check for order effects 
(Harrison et al., 2005). Andersen et al. (2011c) found in one of their treatments that there are no 
statistically or economically significant order effects in the risk and time preference tasks. We 
confirm this finding. 
To reassure subjects about the credibility of the payment from the time preferences task 
we use a front end delay on the sooner and later payments. This allows us to equalize the 
credibility of future payments. In addition, payments were promised by a permanent faculty 
member of the university’s department by means of a notarized post-dated check.  
A. Description of the experiment 
The conventional lab experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007). Subjects consisted of undergraduate students at the AAA University (removed for peer 
review; to be adjusted upon publication) and were recruited using the ORSEE recruiting system 
(Greiner, 2004). During the recruitment, the nature of the experiment and the expected earnings 
were not mentioned. However, subjects were told that they will be given the chance to make 
more money during the experiment. Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to generate 
samples that are less risk averse than would otherwise have been observed (Harrison et al., 
2009). 
Subjects participated in sessions of group sizes that varied from 8 to 11 subjects per 
session. In total, 157 subjects participated in 16 sessions that were conducted between May and 
June 2011. Each session lasted about an hour and subjects were paid a €15 participation fee. 
Subjects were given a power point presentation explaining the risk and time preferences tasks as 
well as printed copies of instructions. Every subject had time to read the instructions at their own 
pace. 
                                                 
2
 In our case the exchange rate is the same for sooner and later amounts. 
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B. The risk preferences phase  
To elicit risk preferences we used the multiple price list (MPL) design devised by Holt 
and Laury (2002). In this design each subject is presented with a choice between two lotteries, A 
or B as illustrated in Table 2. In the first row the subject is asked to make a choice between 
lottery A, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €2 and a 90% chance of receiving €1.6, and 
lottery B, which offers a 10% chance of receiving €3.85 and a 90% chance of receiving €0.1. 
The expected value of lottery A is €1.64 while for lottery B it is €0.475, which results in a 
difference of €1.17 between the expected values of the lotteries. Proceeding down the table to the 
last row, the expected values of the lotteries increase but increases much faster for lottery B. 
For each row, a subject chooses A or B and one row is then randomly selected as binding 
for the payout. The last row is a simple test of whether subjects understood the instructions 
correctly.3 A risk neutral subject should switch from lottery A to lottery B at the 5th row. In our 
experiments subjects undertook three risk aversion tasks: they made choices from Table 2 (the 1x 
table), a table where payoffs were scaled up by 6 (the 6x table) and by 14 (the 14x table).  
Instead of providing a table of choices arrayed in an ordered manner in the same screen 
(e.g., as in Holt & Laury, 2002), each choice was presented separately showing probabilities and 
prizes (as in Andersen et al., 2011c)4. The order of appearance of the tables for each subject was 
completely randomized to avoid order effects (Harrison et al., 2005). The 6x and 14x tables 
served as an elicitation vehicle of risk when larger payoffs are involved. Thus, to infer risk 
preferences, subjects were asked to provide 30 binary choices from the risk preference task. 
Example screens are displayed in the appendix. Financial constraints precluded us from paying 
every single subject in each session; subjects were given a 10% chance of having their choices 
realized. 
 
C. The time preferences phase  
The experimental design for measuring discount rates is based on the experiments of 
Coller and Williams (1999), Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) and Andersen et al. (2008). 
                                                 
3
 19 out of 157 subjects failed to pass this test concerning comprehension of lotteries and were dismissed from our sample. 
4
 For half of the sessions probabilities where displayed using pie charts, while for the other half probabilities where only shown as text. A 
dummy variable controls for this variation in the experimental design. 
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Subjects are confronted with payoff  tables similar to Table 3 and they made choices from three 
tables with different time horizons: the 4-month time horizon table, the 16-month time horizon 
table and the 32-month time horizon table.  
In Table 3, option A offers 250€ in 6 months and option B offers 250€ +x € in 38 months, 
where x ranged from annual interests rates of 5% to 50% on the principal of 250€, compounded 
semi-annualy to be consistent with national banking practices on savings accounts. The table also 
includes the annual and annual effective interest rates to facilitate comparisons between lab and 
field investments (Andersen et al., 2008). The argument for including such seemingly 
unimportant rates is that in many countries, including the country in which the experiment was 
conducted, such rates are required to be provided as part of a regulatory requirement for most 
consumer loans. Another reason is that the experimenter might want to avoid having subjects 
spending extra effort for calculating these rates along with their effort on decision making. 
Andersen et al. (2011a) experimentally varied the provision of such rates and found no effect on 
elicited discount rates. On the other hand, Andersen et al. (2011c) found that providing 
information on implied interest rates led to an increase in the elicited discount rate of 2.3%. 
The tasks provided two future income options instead of one instant and one future 
option. This front-end delay on the early payment has two advantages: it holds the transaction 
costs of future options constant (see Coller & Williams, 1999 for a discussion) and it avoids the 
passion for the present that decision makers exhibit when offered monetary amounts today or in 
the future. It also allows us to equalize the credibility of future payments.  
As previously noted, payments were promised by a permanent faculty member of the 
university’s department by means of a notarized post-dated check. A national bank served as the 
third party guarantor as well. 
Similar to the risk preference task, each choice was presented separately (as in Andersen 
et al., 2011c). We varied between subjects the front end delay (3 months vs. 6 months) and the 
principal of the sooner option (100€ vs. 250€). Andersen et al. (2011c) found that varying the 
principal had no effect on elicited discount rates. We find that it does make a difference though. 
Increasing the principal results in lower discount rates. However, varying the front end delay did 
not have an effet on elicited discount rates. Table 3 displays a sample payoff matrix table with a 
32 month time horizon, a 250€ principal and a front end delay of 6 months. 
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At the end of the experiment only one row was randomly drawn as binding. Financial 
constraints precluded us from paying every single subject in each session; subjects were given a 
10% chance of having their choices realized. Andersen et al. (2011c) vary the probability of 
payment for the discounting task from 10% to 100% and find no significant difference. 
D. The post-experiment phase 
At the end of each session subjects completed a questionnaire asking for basic 
demographic information. Female participants were asked about menstrual cycle information as 
displayed in the appendix. They were told that this is an important part of the survey and were 
asked to take all the time they need to answer the questions accurately. The questions were 
adopted from Pearson and Schipper (2011) and Chen et al. (2009).  
We also measured the length of the index finger (2nd digit) and ring finger (4th digit) of 
the right hand of the respondents using a ruler. Fingers were measured from the crease where the 
finger joins the hand to the tip of the finger. Measures were taken separately by two persons: one 
of the authors and a research assistant. The measures used here are based on the averages of the 
two digit ratios derived separately by each of the researchers. None of the subjects refused the 
measurement of the fingers. Although many of the studies on digit ratios in the literature scan 
individuals’ palms and then measure distances from pictures, this was considered very invasive 
and would have raised privacy issues with student bodies/organizations in our university.  It 
could also involve an accurate imprint of subjects’ fingerprints. Fingerprints are considered 
private data in the country; even the national police do not keep a record of non-active 
fingerprints. As we show later, we think that our measures of digit ratios are accurate given the 
high correlation of digit ratios derived from the measurements taken by the two researchers. Both 
persons were also trained in measuring the 2nd and 4th digit fingers before the conduct of the 
experiments. 
 
IV. Sample 
The sample consists of 157 students of which 19 had to be dropped since they failed to pass a 
comprehension of lotteries test in the risk preference task, as described in a previous section. Of 
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the remaining 138 subjects, 10 indicated using oral contraceptives. None of the female subjects 
was pregnant. 
Table 4 presents the distribution across menstrual cycle phases before and after sample 
attrition. Although we use the sample of 138 students for estimating risk and time preferences, it 
is useful to look at the distribution of the menstrual phases of the sample of female students 
before we consider dropping some of them from the sample. The distribution shown in Table 4 
assumes that all females in our sample follow a cycle of 29-days. In contrast to common beliefs, 
the average duration of a cycle is 29 days (Chiazze et al., 1968; Fehring et al., 2006) and not 28 
days as previous studies have assumed. Average duration of a cycle for females younger than 35 
is  29 days but this drops to an average of 28 days for females older than 35 years old (Fehring et 
al., 2006). Thus, considering the age of our sample of students, a 29-day cycle is more 
appropriate to assume. 
The menstrual cycle can be divided into several different phases. The follicular phase (days 1 
to 16) can be further divided into the menstrual phase (days 1 to 5)5, the proliferative phase (days 
6 to 14) and the ovulatory phase (days 15 to 16)6. The secretory phase lasts about 13 days (days 
17 to 29) on average (see Fehring et al., 2006) and can be divided into the luteal phase (days 17 
to 24) and the premenstrual phase (days 25 to 29)7. Females that use hormonal contraceptives do 
not have a natural menstrual cycle since their circulating levels of hormones may differ from 
naturally cycling women; hence they are treated as a separate group.  
Table 4 also indicates the expected number of subjects if we assume that the probability of 
participation does not vary over the cycle (pill takers are excluded from this calculation)8. A 2  
goodness of fit test allows us to test whether the observed proportions for the observed 
distribution differ from hypothesized proportions. We find that we cannot reject equality of 
distributions for the full sample ( 2 4.7  , p-value=0.320) and even for the sample after attrition 
( 2 4.06  , p-value=0.398). Thus selective participation in the experiment due to menstruating 
                                                 
5
 Duration for the follicular phase and the menstrual phase are average durations reported by several studies reviewed in Table 2 in Fehring et 
al. (2006). 
6
 Duration for the proliferative phase is derived as residual of the follicular phase after subtracting the menstrual and ovulatory phases. The 
ovulatory phase is usually taken to last 2-days which corresponds to the high fertility window in Figure 1 in Fehring et al. (2006). 
7
 The secretory phase is often referred to as the luteal phase and includes the premenstrual phase. 
8
 For example, for the menstrual phase there should be [5 days x (N female subjects – n Pill takers)]/29 days cycle length ≈ 14 subjects. 
17 
 
female subjects staying away is not a significant problem with our data.  Dropping observations 
does not also significantly affect the observed distribution of menstrual phases. 
The assumption of a 29-day cycle is a restrictive one since subjects in our sample exhibit 
significant variation in cycle length. The average duration in our sample is 28.7 days with a 
standard deviation of 2.43. However, we can use the collected cycle length information to 
construct individualized menstrual cycle phases as in Pearson and Schipper (2011). Since the 
length of the secretory phase is relatively fixed (it usually exhibits less variation as compared to 
the proliferative phase as shown in Fehring et al. (2006)), we consider adjusting the length of the 
proliferative phase only. The procedure is similar to Pearson and Schipper (2011). If we define 
subject i’s number of days since first day of the last menstrual cycle as yi and the average 
duration of i’s menstrual cycle as di, then female subject i is in the: 
1. Proliferative Adjusted Premenstrual Phase if and only if yi > di - 5, 
2. Proliferative Adjusted Luteal Phase if and only if yi > di – 13 and i is not in the 
Proliferative Adjusted Premenstrual Phase, 
3. Proliferative Adjusted Ovulatory Phase if and only if yi > di – 15 and i is not in the 
Proliferative Adjusted Premenstrual Phase or the Proliferative Adjusted Luteal Phase, 
4. Proliferative Adjusted Menstrual Phase if and only if i is in the Menstrual Phase. 
5. Proliferative Adjusted Proliferative Phase if and only if i is not in any of the above 
Proliferative Adjusted phases. 
Table 4 exhibits the distribution across adjusted menstrual cycle phases which we use for all 
further analysis. Note that this distribution is not in sharp contrast with unadjusted menstrual 
cycle phases. In fact, Pearson and Schipper (2011) found that their results remain robust when 
using adjusted phases as controls.  
As previously discussed, the fingers for the digit ratios were measured by two researchers. 
The correlation coefficient of the two measures of digit ratios is 0.989. We use the average of 
these two measures of the digit ratio in the analysis. To examine the effect of the D2:D4 ratio on 
risk and time preferences, we first normalized the digit ratios into z-scores by subtracting off the 
sample mean and dividing by the standard deviation. With this transformation, the D2:D4 
coefficient estimates reveal the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the digit ratio on 
risk and time preferences. 
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Figure 2 shows the kernel densities of the distribution of digit ratios by sex. It is obvious that 
the distribution for males is shifted to the left, implying lower digit ratios than females. A t-test 
confirms Figure 2. Females have a mean digit ratio of 1.025 while males have a mean digit ratio 
of 1.002. The difference is statistically significant (t=2.596, p-value=0.01). 
V. Identification of risk and time preferences 
 The identification of risk and time preferences closely follows the framework of Andersen et 
al. (2008), so we will only repeat the basic information here. Andersen et al. (2008) discussed in 
detail how to put parametric structure on the identification of risk and time preferences, the 
theoretical issues involved, and the statistical specification. 
 Let the utility function be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification: 
  1
1
rMU M
r

            (1) 
for r≠1, where r is the CRRA coefficient. In (1), r=0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r>0 denotes 
risk aversion behavior and r<0 denotes risk loving behavior. 
 In addition, if we assume that Expected Utility Theory (EUT) holds for the choices over 
risky alternatives and that discounting is exponential, then the subject is indifferent between two 
income options tM  and tM  if and only if: 
     
1
1t t
U M U M            (2) 
where  tU M  is the utility of monetary outcome tM  for delivery at time t,   is the discount 
rate,   is the horizon for delivery of the later monetary outcome at time t  , and the utility 
function is separable and stationary over time9.   is the discount rate that equalizes the present 
value of the two monetary outcomes in the indifference condition (2). 
The binary choices of the subjects in the risk preference tasks can be explained by 
different CRRA coefficients. For example, a subject that made four safe choices (i.e., choosing 
                                                 
9
 The assumption that the utility function is additively separable implicitly imposes intertemporal risk neutrality. For a relaxation of this 
assumption see Andersen et al. (2011a). Andersen et al. (2011a) find that relaxing the assumption of intertemporal risk neutrality leads to 
comparable results with their earlier results in Andersen et al. (2008) that assumed intertemporal risk neutrality. In addition, since our primary 
purpose is to check whether biological indices have an effect on risk and time preferences, imposing or relaxing the assumption of intertemporal 
risk neutrality would make little difference when comparing different groups of people. 
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option A) and then switched to option B would have revealed a CRRA interval of -0.15 to 0.40. 
The intervals are reported in Table 2. Similarly, the binary choices in the time preference tasks 
can be explained by different discount rates. A subject that chose 300€ in 1 month would have 
revealed a discount rate higher than  / 300 100%x  ; otherwise she would have revealed an annual 
discount rate of  / 300 100%x   or less. 
Andersen et al. (2008) explicitly write the likelihood function for the choices that subjects 
make in these tasks and jointly estimate the risk parameter r and the discount rate  . The 
contribution to the overall likelihood from the risk aversion responses can be written for each 
lottery i as: 
    
1,2
i j j
j
EU p M U M

    (3) 
where  jp M  are the probabilities for each outcome jM  that are induced by the experimenter 
(i.e., columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 in Table 2). To specify the likelihoods conditional on the model, a 
stochastic specification from Holt and Laury (2002) is used. The expected utility (EU) for each 
lottery pair is calculated for the candidate estimate of r and the ratio: 
1
1 1
B
A B
EUEU
EU EU

      (4) 
is then calculated where AEU  and BEU  refer to options A and B respectively, and   is a 
structural noise parameter used to allow some errors. The index in (4) is linked to observed 
choices by specifying that the option B is chosen when 12EU  . Wilcox (2011) proposed the 
“contextual error” specification whereas instead of the latent index in (4), we have: 
 
   
1
1 1
B
B
EU c
EU
EU c EU c

 

          (5) 
In (5) c  is a new normalizing term for each lottery pair A and B. The normalizing 
term is defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in this lottery pair minus the minimum 
utility over all prizes in this lottery pair. Since the value of c  varies between lottery choices, it is 
said to be “contextual.” The conditional log-likelihood can then be written as: 
        ln , ; , ln | 1 ln 1 | 1RA i i
i
L r y EU y EU y       X  (6) 
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where  1 1iy    denotes the choice of the option B (A) lottery in the risk preference task i. 
Subjects were allowed to express indifference between choices and were told that if that choice 
was selected to be played out, the computer would randomly choose one of the two options for 
them and that both choices had equal chances of being selected. Thus the likelihood for these 
choices can be modified such that choices imply a 50/50 mixture of the likelihood of choosing 
either lottery: 
 
     
   
ln | 1 ln 1 | 1
ln , ; , 1 1ln ln 1 | 0
2 2
i i
RA
i i
EU y EU y
L r y
EU EU y

                  
X    (7) 
The conditional log-likelihood for the time preference task can be written in a similar 
manner if we write the discounted utility of each option as: 
1
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and the index of the present values as: 
1
1 1
B
A B
PVPV
PV PV

             (9) 
where   is a noise parameter for the discount rate tasks10. The log-likelihood will then be: 
 
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ln | 1 ln 1 | 1
ln , , ; , 1 1ln ln 1 | 0
2 2
i i
DR
i i
PV y PV y
L r y
PV PV y
 
                    
X    (10) 
and the joint likelihood will be: 
     ln , , , ; , ln , ; , ln , , ; ,RA DRL r y L r y L r y      X X X     (11) 
Each parameter in equation (11) can be allowed to be a linear function of treatment 
effects and/or demographic variables. Equation (11) can be maximized using standard numerical 
methods. We used the routines made available as a supplemental material in Andersen et al. 
(2008) with appropriate modifications. For a more thorough and pedagogical treatise on 
maximum likelihood estimation of utility functions, see Appendix F in Harrison and Rutstrom 
(2008). The statistical specification also takes into account the multiple responses given by the 
                                                 
10
 Contextual utility correction does not need to be applied for these choices since these are over deterministic outcomes. 
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same subject and allows for correlation between responses (clustered standard errors). Standard 
errors were computed using the delta method. 
A. Extensions: Hyperbolic discounting 
The exponential discounting model is one of the discounting functions out of a menagerie of 
discounting functions (Andersen et al., 2011c). We can test for the robustness of the results by 
considering an alternative discounting function assumed by hyperbolic discounting models11. 
Others have found that results are generally robust when considering the choice between an 
exponential discounting model and hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Andersen et al., 2008). 
When considering a hyperbolic discounting function, one would need to replace (8) with: 
1
1
r
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   and    
11
1 1
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k r

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for 0k  .  
B. Extensions: Rank Dependent utility 
Up to now we have only assumed Expected Utility for risk. Since the Allais paradoxes 
(Allais, 1953) for EUT and the Nobel-prize winning work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we 
know that EUT often fails and that one must account for probability weighting especially when 
using smaller scale payoffs. Rank Dependent Utility (Quiggin, 1982) extends the EUT model by 
allowing for decision weights on lottery outcomes. To calculate decision weights under RDU one 
replaces expected utility defined by (3) with: 
        
1,2 1,2
i j j j j
j j
EU w p M U M w U M
 
    
     (13) 
where      2 2 1 1 11w w p p w p w p      and  1 1w w p , with outcomes ranked from 
worst (outcome 2) to best (outcome 1) and  w   is some weighting function. We adopt the 
weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which has been extensively used 
in the literature and assumes weights of the form: 
                                                 
11
 As discussed in Andersen et al. (2008), the use of the quasi-hyperbolic specification is not possible due to the existence of a front end delay 
in our tasks. 
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    11w p p p p               (14) 
 In (14), when 1  , it implies that  w p p  and this serves as a formal test of the 
hypothesis of no probability weighting12.  
C. Extensions: Expo-power function  
The assumption of a CRRA function, implicitly assumes that risk aversion is constant across 
different prize domains. We can relax this assumption by adapting a more flexible form, the 
hybrid expo-power function of Saha (1993). The expo-power function can be defined as 
    11 exp /ru M aM a   , where M is income and a  and r  are parameters to be estimated. 
Relative risk aversion (RRA) is then   11 rr a r M   , so RRA varies with income if 0a  . The 
expo-power function nests CRRA (as 0a  ). 
VI. Estimation and results 
Each subject in our experiment responded to 60 binary tasks (30 for the risk preference 
tasks and 30 for the time preference tasks). Dropping data from subjects who chose lottery A 
over lottery B in the last row of Table 2 resulted in a sample size of 138 subjects, with 4140 risk 
aversion choices and 4140 discount rate choices. Figures A1 to A18 in the Appendix show the 
proportion of choices for each decision in the risk or time preference tasks by menstrual phase, 
progesterone/estradiol level, and digit ratio group. 
A. Gender differences in decision making 
Panel A in Table 5 shows basic estimates when assuming exponential discounting and EUT. 
The first few rows show the effect of treatment variables. We find that the order of tasks has an 
effect on elicited discount rates but it does not affect our risk estimates. The principal has a direct 
effect on discount rates as well. This is consistent with the magnitude effect (Andersen et al., 
2011b) wherein higher discount rates are inferred from choices made with lower principals. 
                                                 
12
 It should be easy to show that    1 2 1 1w p p w   . 
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Gender differences are also evident in our estimates. Males are significantly less risk averse 
than females and have higher discount rates. Panel B of Table 5 shows that results are virtually 
identical when assuming either hyperbolic or exponential discounting. Hence, the choice of the 
discounting function seems not relevant, at least with our data. To simplify the estimations that 
follow, we only use the exponential discounting model. 
Table 6 shows estimates when we allow for RDU and the expo-power function under 
exponential discounting. We can directly test whether RDU and/or expo-power function is 
appropriate by testing whether 1   and/or 0  . Since all the covariates used are dummies we 
need to test for several linear combinations of the coefficients. For example, we can test for 
0 1 2 0Gender a Visual     or for 0 2 3 0a Visual a TaskOrder    . Most of these tests reject 
the null, thus rendering support for an expo-power function. In addition, the corresponding tests 
for   reject the null in all cases as well, thus rendering support for RDU. Joint significance tests 
for 0a   and 1   also reject the null. 
Looking at Table 6, it is obvious that the Gender variable is no longer significant for any of 
the parameters. Thus gender differences may be sensitive to the underlying assumptions. 
B. The role of menstrual cycle in decision making 
In order to explore the role of menstrual cycle on risk and time preferences we use dummies 
that indicate one of the five phases of the cycle of our female subjects. We exclude pill takers for 
now. The omitted category is males, so that all comparisons are with respect to male subjects. 
Panel A in Table 7 shows parameter estimates under RDU, expo-power and exponential 
discounting. Wald tests indicate that we reject the null that 0   or the null that 1   or the 
null that 0   and 1  . Thus, there is support for RDU and expo-power. 
As evident, the only significant menstrual cycle dummies are the menstrual and the luteal 
phases for the a  parameter. Note that the luteal phase is one of the phases where both estradiol 
and progesterone exhibit high levels. Wald tests for whether all the coefficients associated with 
each of the menstrual cycle dummies are zero across all parameters (e.g., 
0menstrual menstrual menstrual mesntrualr a      ), do not reject the null. However, a joint significance 
test for whether all menstrual cycle dummies across all estimated parameters are simultaneously 
equal to zero, highly rejects the null (p-value=0.0). 
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 Panel B in Table 7 shows the estimates once we include the pill takers in our estimations. 
Similar to the case when we excluded the pill takers from the analysis, Wald tests indicate that 
RDU and expo-power are appropriate choices for our data. The change in the magnitude of the 
estimated menstrual cycle dummies is not large (as compared to panel A); however we can see 
that the effect of the luteal phase dummy becomes significant for the discount rate as well. In 
addition, the proliferative phase dummy (estradiol exhibits high levels during this phase) shows a 
statistically significant effect on r . Note that the effect of the menstrual cycle phase is 
marginally not significant. 
Wald tests for whether the coefficients associated with each of the menstrual cycle dummies 
and the pill taker dummy, are zero across all parameters, do not reject the null with the exception 
of the dummies for the luteal phase (p-value=0.025) and the pill taking dummy (p-value=0.0). 
The Wald test for the proliferative dummies is marginally not significant (p-value=0.116). A 
joint significance for whether all menstrual cycle dummies and pill takers dummy across all 
estimated parameters are simultaneously equal to zero, highly rejects the null (p-value=0.0). 
Another way to analyze the data with menstrual cycle information (also taken by Buser, 
2010)  is to divide female subjects into high-estradiol and low-estradiol, as well as, high-
progesterone and low-progesterone subjects. The high estradiol phase corresponds to cycle 
phases two and four while the high progesterone phase coincides with the fourth phase. Table 8 
shows the parameter estimates when we replaced the menstrual cycle dummies of Table 7 with 
dummies that indicate high progesterone/estradiol levels. Wald tests show as before, that RDU 
and expo-power are supported by our data. 
It is obvious that progesterone has a negative effect on parameters r and   (thus indirectly 
affecting discount rates) and a positive direct effect on discount rates. On the other hand, 
estradiol has a positive effect on parameter r  and a marginally not significant positive effect on 
 , but no effect on discount rates. Taking pills as hormonal contraception also has a negative 
effect on parameters r  and  . Wald tests for whether the coefficients associated with estradiol, 
progesterone and the pill taker dummies, are zero across all parameters, highly reject the null 
with the exception of the dummies for estradiol (p-value=0.148). A joint significance for whether 
all progesterone/estradiol and pill takers dummies across all estimated parameters are 
simultaneously equal to zero, highly rejects the null (p-value=0.0). 
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Figure 3 illustrates the RRA predictions for the range of prizes given at the experiment. 
RRA increases across the prize domain. Predictions for males and female subjects in the low 
estradiol-low progesterone phase (phase 1 and 3) are similar and exhibit high risk aversion at 
higher incomes. However, subjects in the high estradiol-high progesterone group (phase 4) 
exhibit significant risk loving preferences for lower incomes. 
C. Prenatal exposure to testosterone and decision making 
As mentioned previously, we use the digit ratio to explore the role of prenatal exposure to 
testosterone on risk and time preferences. Recent work on the relationship between testosterone 
and risk-taking suggests that the effect can be nonlinear (Garbarino et al., 2011; Sapienza et al., 
2009). One way to model this non-linearity is to add a squared term of the digit ratio as a 
covariate; a second approach is to divide males and females into quartiles. Thus we also created 
gender specific dummies based on the 25th and 75th quartile. Subjects on the 25th quartile of their 
same gender distribution were categorized into the low digit ratio group; subjects above the 75th 
quartile of their same gender distribution were classified into the high digit ratio group. The 
remaining subjects (i.e., between the 25th and 75th quartile) formed the medium digit ratio group. 
Panel A in Table 9 shows the estimates when we add digit ratio squared as a covariate to 
capture possible non-linearities. Similar tests, as before, support RDU and expo-power. Neither 
the digit ratio nor its squared term is statistically significant for any of the parameters.  
Panel B in Table 9 shows the estimates when we use dummies based on digit ratio 
quartile groups. Similarly, Wald tests support RDU and expo-power. The medium digit ratio 
group has a negative direct effect on discount rates and a positive effect on the r parameter as 
compared to the low digit ratio group. Note that low digit ratios suggest prenatal exposure to 
higher testosterone levels. In addition, the negative effect of the high digit ratio group on 
discount rates is marginally not significant. 
Figure 4 illustrates the RRA predictions for the range of prizes given at the experiment. 
RRA increases across the range of prizes but increases less for subjects with medium digit ratios. 
Males with low digit ratio exhibit high risk loving preferences, at least for the lower prize 
domain. The pattern is less clear for females since the confidence intervals span around zero, 
although females with low digit ratio seem to be slightly more risk loving than other digit ratio 
same-sex groups. 
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VII. Conclusions 
The issue of whether preferences of males and females have biological roots is relevant 
given that gender differences have been observed in important domains of economic decision 
making including consumption, investment and in the labor market.  Knowledge about the 
possible biological underpinnings of people’s preferences and how these factors influence 
differences in behavior between genders can be used to further illuminate the debate on gender-
specific market outcomes and provide some important insights into the biology of people’s risk 
and time preferences. The findings however of the studies that examined the relationship 
between hormones and risk preferences have been inconsistent and no other known study has 
really examined the direct link between hormonal levels and non-hypothetically elicited time 
preferences. Hence, given the generally scant literature but increasing interest in this area of 
research, we attempted to examine the biological roots of people’s risk and time preferences by 
exploring if observed gender differences can be explained by (a) natural fluctuations in 
progesterone and estradiol levels during the menstrual cycle and by (b) prenatal exposure to 
testosterone levels.   
We elicited risk and time preferences and then jointly estimated the parameters of interest 
using a structural econometrics model. First we find that observed differences in aggregate 
gender effects can be sensitive to the functional forms assumed. Indeed, when we used a more 
flexible functional form for the utility (the expo-power) function and allowed for probability 
weighting for the risk choices (rank-dependent utility), the gender differences in risk and time 
preferences, as captured by a gender dummy, disappeared.  
The second thing our results suggest is that natural fluctuations in progesterone levels have a 
direct effect on discount rates. We also found that both estradiol and progesterone levels can 
indirectly affect time preferences by changing the curvature of the utility function (i.e., affecting 
risk preferences). Our results indicate that prenatal exposure to testosterone, as proxied by the 
digit ratio, is a significant predictor of risk and time preferences. Subjects with low digit ratio 
(i.e., high exposure to testosterone) exhibit higher discount rates. In addition, these subjects also 
exhibit risk loving preferences. This is particularly true for males, while for females the picture is 
not as clear. 
On the methodological front, while we have been very careful in collecting hormonal 
measures based on menstrual cycle information and digit ratios, it is still possible that these 
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measures could suffer measurement errors. Future studies should attempt to find other ways to 
objectively assess hormonal levels. Other types of hormonal measurement (i.e., blood or saliva 
samples) are quite invasive and expensive.  On the other hand, exogenous variation of hormones 
(e.g., testosterone administration) may not be feasible in many situations, not to mention the 
sensitivity and challenge of getting institutional approvals for such procedures. Development or 
examination of accurate but more applicable methods of measuring hormonal levels can help 
researchers assess the robustness of our findings related to the biology of risk and time 
preferences.  
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Table 1. Hormones and economic decision making literature 
Type of study Citations 
Indirect measures of 
hormones (menstrual cycle)  
(N=9) 
(Bröder & Hohmann, 2003; Burns, 2006; Buser, 2010; Buser, 
2011; Chen et al., 2009; Da Silva et al., 2011; Pearson & 
Schipper, 2011; Schipper, 2011a; Wozniak et al., 2011) 
Indirect measures of 
prenatal exposure to 
hormones (D2:D4 ratio) 
(N=19) 
(Apicella et al., 2008; Apicella et al., 2011; Brañas-Garza & 
Rustichini, 2011; Buser, 2011; Coates et al., 2009 ; Coates & 
Page, 2009; Da Silva et al., 2011; Dreber & Hoffman, 2007; 
Garbarino et al., 2011; Guiso & Rustichini, 2011; Millet & 
Dewitte, 2006; Millet & Dewitte, 2008; Millet & Dewitte, 2009; 
Pearson & Schipper, 2012; Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 2010; 
Sapienza et al., 2009; Schipper, 2011a; Trahms et al., 2010; van 
den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006) 
Direct measures of 
hormones (saliva or blood 
samples) 
(N=11) 
(Apicella et al., 2008; Apicella et al., 2011; Burnham, 2007; 
Coates & Herbert, 2008; Sanchez-Pages & Turiegano, 2010; 
Sapienza et al., 2009; Schipper, 2011a; Schipper, 2011b; White 
et al., 2006; Zak et al., 2005a; Zak et al., 2005b) 
Administration of hormones 
(N=5) 
(Eisenegger et al., 2010; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Zak et al., 2009; 
Zak et al., 2007; Zethraeus et al., 2009) 
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Table 2. Sample payoff matrix in the risk aversion experiments 
Lottery A Lottery B EVA 
(€) 
EVB 
(€) 
Difference 
(€) 
Open CRRA 
interval if subject 
switches to 
Lottery B 
p € p € p € p € 
0.1 2 0.9 1.6 0.1 3.85 0.9 0.1 1.640 0.475 1.17 -∞ -1.71
0.2 2 0.8 1.6 0.2 3.85 0.8 0.1 1.680 0.850 0.83 -1.71 -0.95
0.3 2 0.7 1.6 0.3 3.85 0.7 0.1 1.720 1.225 0.50 -0.95 -0.49
0.4 2 0.6 1.6 0.4 3.85 0.6 0.1 1.760 1.600 0.16 -0.49 -0.15
0.5 2 0.5 1.6 0.5 3.85 0.5 0.1 1.800 1.975 -0.18 -0.15 0.14 
0.6 2 0.4 1.6 0.6 3.85 0.4 0.1 1.840 2.350 -0.51 0.14 0.41 
0.7 2 0.3 1.6 0.7 3.85 0.3 0.1 1.880 2.725 -0.85 0.41 0.68 
0.8 2 0.2 1.6 0.8 3.85 0.2 0.1 1.920 3.100 -1.18 0.68 0.97 
0.9 2 0.1 1.6 0.9 3.85 0.1 0.1 1.960 3.475 -1.52 0.97 1.37 
1 2 0 1.6 1 3.85 0 0.1 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞ 
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not 
shown to subjects. 
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Table 3. Payoff table for 32 month horizon in discount rate experiments 
Payoff 
alternative 
Payment option 
A in € 
(Pays amount 
below in 6 month)
Payment option B 
in € 
(Pays amount 
below in 38 months)
Annual 
interest rate in 
% 
Annual 
effective 
interest rate in 
% 
1 250 257.78 5 4.5 
2 250 265.56 10 9 
3 250 273.33 15 13.5 
4 250 281.11 20 18 
5 250 288.89 25 22.5 
6 250 296.67 30 27 
7 250 304.44 35 31.5 
8 250 312.22 40 36 
9 250 320.00 45 40.5 
10 250 327.78 50 45 
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Table 4. Participation by menstrual cycle phases 
Menstrual cycle 
phases 
Days Full sample Sample after attrition Expected 
percentage 
of subjects 
  29-
days 
cycle 
Expect
ed 
number 
of 
subjects 
29-
days 
cycle 
Expect
ed 
number 
of 
subjects 
Adjuste
d 
 
Menstrual phase 1-5 8 14 8 10 12 17% 
Proliferative phase 6-14 22 25 17 18 21 31% 
Ovulatory phase 15-16 7 6 7 4 5 7% 
Luteal phase 17-24 25 22 20 16 18 28% 
Pre-menstrual phase 25-29 18 14 15 10 12 17% 
Hormonal 
contraceptives 
 12 - 10 - 10 - 
Total  92  77  77  
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Table 5. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming CRRA and EUT 
CRRA coefficient (r) 
Individual discount rate (  for 
exponential, k  for hyperbolic) 
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
A. Exponential discounting (N=8280, Log pseudolikelihood= -3851.052) 
Visual -0.001 0.044  - - 
Task Order -0.031 0.055  0.084** 0.035 
Front End Delay - -  -0.010 0.021 
Principal - -  -0.070** 0.024 
Gender -0.116** 0.059  0.071* 0.037 
Constant 0.551** 0.056  0.236** 0.036 
  0.183** 0.015    
     0.025** 0.004 
B. Hyperbolic discounting (N=8280, Log pseudolikelihood= -3823.421) 
Visual -0.002 0.045  - - 
Task Order -0.033 0.057  0.081** 0.034 
Front End Delay - -  -0.007 0.021 
Principal - -  -0.069** 0.023 
Gender -0.120** 0.060  0.069** 0.035 
Constant 0.534** 0.057  0.236** 0.035 
  0.187** 0.015    
     0.025** 0.004 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level.  
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Table 6. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming expo-power function and RDU 
(under exponential discounting) 
r a     
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Visual -0.195 0.208 0.512 0.569 -0.067 0.069 - - 
Task Order -0.147 0.218 0.655 0.472 -0.036 0.075 0.126 0.160 
Front End Delay - - - - - - -0.031 0.050 
Principal - - - - - - -0.292** 0.078 
Gender -0.004 0.166 0.322 0.501 0.026 0.060 -0.011 0.138 
Constant -0.011 0.258 0.578 0.657 0.513** 0.093 0.564** 0.123 
  0.151** 0.007       
        0.036** 0.007 
N=8280, Log-pseudolikelihood= -3745.362
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level.  
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Table 7. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming expo-power function and RDU 
(under exponential discounting) – with menstrual cycle dummies 
A. Excluding pill takers (N=7680, Log-pseudolikelihood= -3381.641) 
 r a      
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Visual -0.191 0.281 0.619 0.719 -0.068 0.082 - - 
Task Order -0.105 0.189 0.380 0.524 -0.022 0.059 0.184 0.169 
Front End Delay - - - - - - -0.010 0.052 
Principal - - - - - - -0.279** 0.077 
Menstrual  -0.094 0.415 1.727* 1.037 -0.036 0.142 -0.128 0.175 
Proliferative  0.254 0.389 -0.637 1.088 0.020 0.131 -0.016 0.124 
Ovulatory  -0.041 0.377 -0.026 0.954 -0.027 0.122 -0.124 0.220 
Luteal  -0.168 0.235 -1.116* 0.630 -0.081 0.058 0.311 0.231 
Pre-menstrual  -0.154 0.255 0.106 0.850 -0.038 0.081 0.018 0.160 
Constant -0.055 0.150 1.239 1.259 0.530** 0.050 0.500** 0.170 
  0.142** 0.010    
     0.035** 0.015 
B. Including pill takers (N=8280, Log-pseudolikelihood= -3669.918) 
 r a      
 Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Visual -0.197* 0.118 0.654 0.430 -0.063** 0.029 - - 
Task Order -0.060 0.113 0.453 0.461 -0.008 0.029 0.132 0.132 
Front End Delay - - - - - - -0.030 0.059 
Principal - - - - - - -0.330** 0.080 
Menstrual  -0.098 0.195 3.200 1.957 -0.033 0.058 -0.236 0.146 
Proliferative  0.409* 0.219 -0.823 0.837 0.080 0.071 -0.104 0.145 
39 
 
Ovulatory  -0.071 0.291 -0.090 0.933 -0.035 0.076 -0.128 0.212 
Luteal  -0.260 0.194 -1.123** 0.558 -0.094** 0.048 0.447* 0.234 
Pre-menstrual  0.039 0.199 -0.133 0.848 0.030 0.066 -0.040 0.160 
Pill -0.665** 0.320 -0.011 0.644 -0.145** 0.036 0.571 0.435 
Constant -0.128 0.118 1.086 0.719 0.500** 0.039 0.599** 0.127 
  0.142** 0.008    
     0.039** 0.009 
Note: **, * = Significance at 5%, 10% level.  
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Table 8. Estimates of risk and time preferences assuming expo-power function and RDU 
(under exponential discounting) – with progesterone, estradiol dummies, including pill takers 
 r a     
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Visual -0.188* 0.105 0.648 0.418 -0.057** 0.025 - - 
Task Order -0.111 0.096 0.725 0.493 -0.025 0.024 0.107 0.112 
Front End Delay - - - - - - -0.023 0.058 
Principal - - - - - - -0.310** 0.068 
Estradiol  0.416** 0.182 -1.025 0.866 0.080 0.049 -0.045 0.134 
Progesterone  -0.718** 0.231 -0.195 0.827 -0.183** 0.057 0.630* 0.358 
Pill -0.672* 0.356 0.365 0.742 -0.143** 0.040 0.383 0.365 
Constant -0.094 0.105 0.858 0.692 0.508** 0.034 0.587** 0.118 
  0.143** 0.007       
     
   0.043** 0.010 
N=8280, Log pseudolikelihood= -3702.036 
 
  
41 
 
Table 9. Estimates of risk and time preferences for digit ratio assuming expo-power function 
and RDU (under exponential discounting)  
A. With D2:D4 ratio squared term (N=8280, Log pseudolikelihood= -3728.774) 
 r a     
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Visual -0.218 0.165 0.555 0.483 -0.073 0.052 - - 
Task Order -0.194 0.186 0.632 0.482 -0.050 0.062 0.159 0.144 
Front End Delay - - - - - - -0.039 0.046 
Principal - - - - - - -0.278** 0.073 
Gender  0.010 0.168 0.349 0.541 0.028 0.058 -0.019 0.123 
D2:D4 ratio  -0.017 0.087 0.254 0.231 -0.015 0.033 -0.050 0.047 
(D2:D4 ratio)2 0.006 0.024 -0.098 0.158 0.007 0.013 0.030 0.024 
Constant 0.010 0.207 0.680 0.663 0.517** 0.072 0.529** 0.126 
  0.151** 0.007       
     
   0.036** 0.007 
B. With dummies based on D2:D4 ratio quartiles (N=8280, Log pseudolikelihood= -3720.218) 
 r a      
 Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Visual -0.170 0.113 0.470 0.391 -0.058* 0.034 - - 
Task Order -0.071 0.110 0.462 0.507 -0.008 0.033 0.132 0.139 
Front End Delay - - - - - - -0.043 0.060 
Principal - - - - - - -0.318** 0.121 
Gender  -0.328 0.228 0.400 0.607 -0.083 0.072 0.222 0.164 
Medium D2:D4 
ratio  0.511* 0.290 -0.405 0.665 0.167 0.128 -0.256** 0.120 
High D2:D4 
ratio  0.182 0.156 0.424 0.592 0.028 0.041 -0.198 0.130 
Constant -0.133 0.217 0.444 0.922 0.493** 0.071 0.663** 0.151 
  0.151** 0.009       
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        0.035** 0.006 
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Figure 1. Hormone levels over the menstrual cycle (data obtained from Stricker et al., 2006) 
 
  
Figure 2. Kernel density of D2:D4 ratios by sex 
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Figure 3. RRA predictions and confidence intervals 
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Figure 4. RRA predictions and confidence intervals  
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Appendix 
Menstrual cycle questions: 
1. How many days ago was the first day of your last menstrual period (first day of your 
cycle)? 
2. On average, how many days are there between your menstrual cycles? 
□ < 25 □ 25 □ 26 □ 27 □ 28 □ 29 □ 30 □ 31 □ 32 □ 33 □ 34 □ 35 □ 36 □ >36 
3. How many days does your menstruation last on average? 
□ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □ 6 □ 7 □ 8 □ 9 
4. Do you currently use a hormone-based contraceptive like birth control pills?  
□ Yes □ No 
5. Do you currently experience any symptoms of Premenstrual Syndrome?  
□ None □ Mild □ Severe 
6. Are you currently pregnant? 
□ Yes □ No 
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Sample screen for risk preference task 
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Sample screen for time preference task 
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Figure A1. Proportion of choices in each decision for the x1 risk preference task by menstrual phase 
(solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A2. Proportion of choices in each decision for the x6 risk preference task by menstrual phase 
(solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
%
 o
f s
ub
je
ct
s 
ch
oo
si
ng
 A
 o
ve
r B
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decision
Males Menstrual phase
Proliferative phase Ovulatory phase
Luteal phase Premenstrual phase
x6 task
51 
 
 
Figure A3. Proportion of choices in each decision for the x14 risk preference task by menstrual phase 
(solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A4. Proportion of choices in each decision for the x1 risk preference task by estradiol, 
progesterone level (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A5. Proportion of choices in each decision for the x6 risk preference task by estradiol, 
progesterone levels (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A6. Proportion of choices in each decision for the x14 risk preference task by estradiol, 
progesterone level (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A7. Proportion of choices in each decision for the x1 risk preference task by digit ratio group 
(solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A8. Proportion of choices in each decision for the x6 risk preference task by digit ratio group 
(solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A9. Proportion of choices in each decision for the x6 risk preference task by digit ratio group 
(solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A10. Proportion of choices in each decision for the 16 weeks interval in the time preference task 
by menstrual phase (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A11. Proportion of choices in each decision for the 16 weeks interval in the time preference task 
by menstrual phase (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A12. Proportion of choices in each decision for the 32 weeks interval in the time preference task 
by menstrual phase (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A13. Proportion of choices in each decision for the 4 weeks interval in the time preference task 
by estradiol, progesterone level (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A14. Proportion of choices in each decision for the 16  weeks interval in the time preference task 
by estradiol, progesterone level (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A15. Proportion of choices in each decision for the 32 weeks interval in the time preference task 
by estradiol, progesterone level (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A16. Proportion of choices in each decision for the 4 weeks interval in the time preference task 
by digit ratio group (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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Figure A17. Proportion of choices in each decision for the 16 weeks interval in the time preference task 
by digit ratio group (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
  
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
%
 o
f s
ub
je
ct
s 
ch
oo
si
ng
 A
 o
ve
r B
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decision
High D2:D4 Medium D2:D4
Low D2:D4
16 weeks interval
66 
 
 
 
Figure A18. Proportion of choices in each decision for the 32 weeks interval in the time preference task 
by digit ratio group (solid line without markers represents risk neutrality under EUT) 
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